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Five oceanvessels were investigated for the characterization and quantiﬁcation of gaseous com-
pounds emitted during ocean transportation of wood pellets in closed cargo hatches from
Canada to Sweden. The study was initiated after a fatal accident with several injured during
discharge in Sweden. The objective with the investigation was to better understand the off-
gassing and issues related to workers’ exposure. Air sampling was done during transport
and immediately before discharge in the undisturbed headspace air above the wood pellets
and in the staircase adjacent to each hatch. The samples were analyzed with Fourier transform
infrared spectroscopy and direct reading instruments. The following compounds and ranges
were detected in samples from the ﬁve ships: carbon monoxide (CO) 1460–14650 ppm, carbon
dioxide (CO2) 2960–21570 ppm, methane 79.9–956 ppm, butane equivalents 63–842 ppm, eth-
ylene 2–21.2 ppm, propylene 5.3–36 ppm, ethane 0–25 ppm and aldehydes 2.3–35 ppm. The ox-
ygen levels were between 0.8 and 16.9%. The concentrations in the staircases were almost as
high as in the cargo hatches, indicating a fairly free passage of air between the two spaces. Apo-
tentially dangerous atmosphere was reached within a week from loading. The conclusions are
that ocean transportation of wood pellets in conﬁned spaces may produce an oxygen deﬁcient
atmosphere and lethal levels of CO which may leak into adjacent access spaces. The dangerous
combination of extremely high levels of CO and reduced oxygen produces a fast-acting toxic
combination. Measurement of CO in combination with oxygen is essential prior to entry in
spaces having air communication with cargo hatches of wood pellets. Forced ventilation of
staircases prior to entry is necessary. Redesign, locking and labeling of access doors and the
establishment of rigorous entry procedures and training of onboard crew as well as personnel
boarding ocean vessels are also important.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of wood pellets as an energy source for
domestic, municipal and industrial use has increased
dramatically during the last few years. A direct con-
sequence of this is that ocean transportation of the
commodity in large bulk has become common-
place, and in 2007,  40% of the total global wood
pellet production of 9 million tons underwent shorter
or longer ocean transportation (Melin, 2007). The
majority of wood pellets are produced by milling
wood chips, bark, planer shavings or sawdust into
a ﬁne powder, which after drying is compressed into
pellets of 6- or 8-mm diameter. The dense wood pel-
let has moisture content of 10% or less. The pellets
described in this paper were made from sawdust
and planer shavings from Lodgepole pine (Pinus
Contorta).
The risks associated with the transportation of
seemingly harmless cargo such as wood and wood
products, including wood pellets, are neither well-
known nor properly understood. This study was ini-
tiated after a fatal accident onboard a vessel in the
Port of Helsingborg, Sweden, in November 2006,
which occurred while the vessel was discharging
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259wood pellets from British Columbia, Canada. One
seaman was killed, a stevedore was seriously injured
and several rescueworkers were slightly injured after
entering an unventilated stairway next to a cargo
hold. The dead seaman was removed after  15
min. The injured stevedore lost consciousness and
was pulseless when removed from the contaminated
atmosphere after  10 min. He was treated with
hyperbaric oxygen but his condition deteriorated
with the onset of neurological symptoms that later
proved to be caused by a cerebral vascular lesion
which eventually left him bound to a wheel chair. It
was ﬁrst believed that the workers were affected by
lack of oxygen, but on arrival at the hospital, it was
concluded that they had also been exposed to carbon
monoxide (CO).
The vessels used for these 7- to 9-week ocean
voyages are classiﬁed as box-shaped dry-cargo vessels
and used for transport of pulp, lumber, wood pellets
etc. in the Paciﬁc as well as in the Atlantic Oceans.
Wood pellets have been transported between British
Columbia and European ports since 1997. In 2002,
one stevedore died and several other workers were
injured in the Port of Rotterdam under similar cir-
cumstances, but to our knowledge, that accident
has not been reported in the scientiﬁc literature, nor
has there been any systematic quantiﬁcation of gas
emissions during other shipments of wood pellets.
A typical vessel of this type has up to 10 cargo
holds, each of which can hold  3000 tons of wood
pellets. Adjacent to the each hold is an access stair-
way (Australian ladder type) leading from the out-
side deck down to the bottom of the vessel, see Fig.
1. This ladder is entered through a deck-access door.
The stairway has three landings, each equipped with
a door in to the cargo hold. These doors are closed
and sometimes taped during the voyage. Wood pel-
lets must at all times be protected from water and
the hatch covers (pontoon type) and the stairway ac-
cess doors on deck are closed during the voyage. The
doors are labeled on the outside and sometimes on
the inside with warnings of a possible oxygen-deﬁ-
cient atmosphere, but there is no reference to the po-
tential presence of hazardous gases.
At the time of the fatal accident in the Port of Hel-
singborg, no air measurements had been taken prior
to entering the stairway, contrary to the usual routine
of making an oxygen check. The deck-access door
had been left open for  8 h on the previous day while
another cargo hold was discharged. However, due to
the risk of rain, all doors were closed after the shift
ended at 22:00 and opened again at 05:45 the next
morning, the day of the accident. The accident oc-
curred around 08:00.
It has previously been reported that CO and other
one-carbon compounds, such as methanol, formic
acidandformaldehyde,areemittedfromwoodpellets
during storage in warehouses (Svedberg et al., 2004).
The authors also reported emissions of aldehydes,
predominantly hexanal and pentanal,which they sug-
gested were formed by a radical-induced oxidative
degradation of natural lipids, particularly the polyun-
saturated linoleic acid. The biochemical mechanism
by which the one-carbon compounds were formed
was not clear but again the oxidation of fatty acids
and other components in the wood seemed likely.
Theoxidativeprocessesoccurredbelowroomtemper-
ature but were accelerated by elevated temperature.
The immediate objective of the present study was
to investigate and describe the composition and con-
centrations of gaseous compounds in the stairways
and cargo holds of vessels carrying wood pellets, in
Fig. 1. Schematics of sampling points in the cargo hold and stairway on Vessel #4.
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related to the exposure of the workers.
METHODS
Five different vessels carrying wood pellets from
British Columbia were investigated after arrival in
the Port of Helsingborg, Sweden. Before the hatch
covers were removed, air samples were collected
through a small side door leading to the headspace
air above the pellet bed. Air samples were collected
2 days after the accident from an undisturbed cargo
hold from the vessel on which the fatal accident took
place (Vessel #1). On Vessel #3 and #5, samples were
also collected in the undisturbed air of the respective
stairways by lowering sampling tubes through
a slightly opened access door. The samples were col-
lected by pumping the air into Tedlar sample bags
which were analyzed immediately on the dockside
in a mobile laboratory installed in a minivan or
within the next few days in one of our laboratories
in Sweden. Vessel #4 was sampled by pumping the
air through long nylon tubing directly to the analyti-
cal cell in the mobile laboratory. All samples were
analyzed using Fourier transform infrared spec-
troscopy (FTIR) instruments (Bomem MB-series,
Bomem, Quebec, Canada), equipped with gas cells
(White type) and nitrogen-cooled mercury–
cadmium–telluride detectors. The FTIR technique
detects gaseous compounds in the 2.5- to 11.5-lm
infrared wavelength region. The concentrations of
CO, carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4)i n
the spectra were analyzed by ﬁtting a set of calibra-
tion spectra based on the Hitran2000 spectral data-
base (Grifﬁth, 1996; Rothman et al., 2003).
Alkanes (CnH2nþ2), ethylene, propylene, methanol
and propanal concentrations were retrieved using
the PNNL database (Sharpe et al., 2004). The uncer-
tainty in the concentration retrievals is made up of
the absolute uncertainty in the absorption cross sec-
tions in the databases, and the uncertainty in the ﬁt-
ting procedure itself. For CO, CO2,C H 4, ethylene
and alkanes (C3 and higher), the overall uncertainty
was 5%, for propylene 6% and 8% for methanol. Eth-
ane and propanal concentrations were associated
with a 15% uncertainty in the present study. Alkanes
were retrieved in the 3.2- to 3.7-lm wavelength re-
gion, where the absorption is due to the C–H bond.
The speciﬁcity among the different alkanes are thus
somewhat limited, but the total alkane mass can be
retrieved well, ﬁtting a set of different alkanes. Pro-
pane and pentane were used in the ﬁt, whereas the to-
tal alkane mass is presented as butane equivalents.
Upon discharge of the wood pellets, oxygen was
measured using a direct-reading, hand-held instru-
ment, RKI-GX-2001 (Riken Keiki Co. Ltd, Tokyo,
Japan), with a galvanic cell sensor, calibrated with
ambient air and 12% oxygen span gas.
In an attempt to describe the dynamics of the off-
gassing during the voyage, a system of sampling
points was installed in one cargo hold and the respec-
tive stairway prior to the loading of Vessel #4, sche-
matically outlined in Fig. 1. Sampling could thus be
carried out from two sample panels without opening
the deck-access door and hatch cover. Measurement
of CO and oxygen were taken three times a day by
the vessel’s crew during the ocean transport, using
a gas meter, model ATX620 (Industrial Scientiﬁc,
Oakdale, PA, USA), equipped with an electrochemi-
cal sensor and calibrated with zero-gas (20.9% O2
and 79.1% N2) and 100 ppm CO.
Oxygen depletion in a cargo hold is believed to be
caused by several mechanisms. Corrosion consumes
oxygen. Microbiological activity both consumes oxy-
gen and produces CO2. Oxygen may also dissolve in
water. However, our belief is that the primary mecha-
nisms for oxygen depletion in wood pellets are trig-
gered by oxidative reactions with wood constituents.
Linoleic acid (CAS 60-33-3) is the predominant
unsaturated fatty acid in wood and presumably also
in wood pellets. It is difﬁcult to buy the pure fatty
acids present in wood in larger quantities, but they
are readily available in mixture in commercial lin-
seed oil. The major constituents of the linseed oil
sold in Sweden are the unsaturated fatty acids lino-
lenic acid (CAS 463-40-1)  56%, oleic acid (CAS
112-80-1)  18% and the above mentioned linoleic
acid  15.4%. To explore the hypothesis that oxida-
tive degradation of fatty acids occurs and to identify
gaseous emissions, a simple experiment was staged
where the headspace air of common raw linseed oil
was investigated. A sealed 1-l plastic bottle contain-
ing linseed oil was acquired from a paint shop. The
bottle showed clear signs of deﬂation, indicating ox-
ygen depletion in the headspace air. With an airtight
syringe, a sample of headspace air was collected and
analyzed, without dilution, in a 50-ml FTIR gas cell
with a 1-m optical path (Axiom Analytical Inc.,
Irvine, CA, USA). The oxygen level in the bottle
was measured with the hand-held instrument,
RKI-GX-2001.
Hydrogen sulﬁde, (H2S), is formed during anaero-
bic bacterial decomposition of the sulfurous material
in organic matter. The FTIR method used in this pro-
ject was not sensitive enough to measure hydrogen
sulﬁde in levels ,100 ppm. Screening measurements
with H2S monitors prior to this study indicated no
H2S in a cargo of wood pellets and it was therefore
omitted from further evaluation unless its presence
was indicated in the FTIR spectra.
RESULTS
The results from the measurements aboard the ves-
sels and from the headspace of the linseed oil are
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high CO and CO2 concentrations and the low oxygen
levels. No indication of the presence of H2S was
seen. When the oxygen level from each vessel was
plotted as function of the CO level, a high degree
of correlation was obtained (r
2) 5 0.92, see Fig. 2.
Good correlation was also found between CO and
butane equivalents (r
2 5 0.93) and CO2 and propyl-
ene (r
2 5 0.98).
The aldehyde concentrations aboard the vessels
were much lower than in previous ﬁndings in pellet
warehouses. The qualitative analysis of headspace
air above linseed oil revealed the presence of all
the gas species found in the cargo holds and the re-
duction of the oxygen level was similar. The relative
concentrations of aldehydes and ethane were higher.
The concentrations in the stairways were consider-
ably lower than the levels found in the adjacent cargo
holds, (Vessel #3 and #5). The stairway on Vessel #4
was sampled on four different levels, showing ,1%
stratiﬁcation throughout the air column of the
stairway.
The results from the measurements aboard theves-
sels of oxygen at the bottom of the stairway and in
the headspace of the cargo hold on Vessel #4 are de-
scribed in Fig. 3. A steady state with  10% oxygen
level was reached after  3 weeks at sea. The CO
level in the headspace of the hold reached 900 ppm
after 7 days. The onboard CO instrumentation was
found to be unreliable over 1000 ppm and further
evaluation of this parameter was not possible until
the FTIR analysis was available at the time the cargo
was discharged in the Port of Helsingborg.
While Vessel #4 was discharging, the decay of CO
at the bottom level of the stairway was monitored at
2.5-min intervals over a period of 2 h. The sample air
was pumped to the mobile FTIR unit located along-
side the vessel. Initially, the stairway deck-access
door was closed and almost no decay could be seen.
The door was then opened to simulate the usual self-
ventilation procedure. Over the next 45 min, an expo-
nential decay (r
2 5 1.00) was recorded corresponding
to a ventilation rate of 0.23 air exchanges per hour. In-
order for the CO concentration at the bottom level of
the stairway to reach an acceptable 8-h occupational
exposure limit of 35 ppm according to Swedish stand-
ards, 26 h of ventilation would have been required.
DISCUSSION
The results from this study strongly suggest that
immediate action needs to be taken in the maritime
industry to prevent fatal accidents aboard cargo ves-
sels. The extremely high CO concentrations and low
oxygen levels found in the stairways are the most im-
portant ﬁndings from the point of view of workers’
health. The combined toxic effect of CO and low ox-
ygen content is the most likely explanation for the
rapid course of events leading to the tragic fatality
and severe injury aboard Vessel # 1. The recorded
CO2 concentrations were occasionally above ac-
cepted short-term occupational exposure limits but
are not considered life threatening by itself, although
synergistic health effects with CO and O2 may exist.
The other chemicals identiﬁed were below or well
below accepted exposure limits. The low aldehydes’
levels compared to previous ﬁndings in warehouses
can probably be explained by the fact that this partic-
ular emission decreases with time more rapidly than
the others, and the several reloads of the pellets be-
tween production and ﬁnal discharge.
Wood pellets undergo drying and heat treatment
during processing, which may alter the chemical
composition of the fatty acids in the wood. However,
the results from the headspace analysis of linseed oil
support the hypothesis that oxidative degradation of
fatty acids occurs, and may explain at least part of
the formation of gaseous compounds identiﬁed in
headspace above wood pellets. The formation of
CO explains only a fraction of the oxygen depletion.
The majority of the oxygen is believed to be chemi-
cally bound in the oxidative degradation process of
fatty acids and other organic materials present in
wood. The recording of 0.8% oxygen in hold 2 on
Vessel #5 shows that wood pellets may trap almost
all available oxygen. One possible explanation for
the fact that such low levels were not seen in every
hold is that this particular hold may have been well
sealed, with limited air communication to ambient air.
It is believed that the mechanisms behind oxygen
depletion and the formation of gaseous compounds
are quite complex and a deeper analysis is beyond
the scope of this study. The high correlation found
between several of the gaseous compounds may pro-
vide additional leads to an understanding of these
mechanisms. In spite of its limitations, the infor-
mation obtained from the experimental study with
linseed oil provides important information, which
may be useful in designing future studies of these
processes.
CO is an odorless and colorless gas. CO binds to
hemoglobin (Hb) forming a COHb complex that in-
hibits the ability of hemoglobin to bind oxygen.
The level of CO saturation in the blood is measured
as % COHb. Normal levels are 0.3–0.8% COHb,
smokers have 3–8% COHb and most people who
die from CO poisoning have .60% COHb (NAS/
COT, 2005) The injured stevedore in the accident
on Vessel #1 had 43.8% COHb when admitted to
the hospital. For theworking population, a maximum
of 3.5% COHb at the end of shift and 20 ppm in end-
exhaled air is suggested (ACGIH, 2007).
The occupational exposure limits for CO by inha-
lation in Sweden is 35 ppm for 8 h and 100 ppm for
15 min (Arbetarskyddsstyrelsen, 2005). The current
ACGIH’s time weighted average is 25 ppm (ACGIH,
262 U. Svedberg, J. Samuelsson and S. MelinTable 1. Summary of all measurements from each vessel and headspace of linseed oil
Vessel #1
Hold
Vessel #2
Hold
Vessel #3
Hold
Vessel #3
Stair
Vessel #4
Stair
a Vessel #5
Hold 2
Vessel #5
Stair 2
Vessel #5
Hold 4
Vessel # 5
Stair 4
Vessel #5
Hold 6
Vessel #5
Stair 6
Linseed Oil
Headspace
November
2006
January
2007
February
2007
February
2007
March
2007
October
2007
October
2007
October
2007
October
2007
October
2007
October
2007
CO 5850 6980 14 650 10 960 11 510 11 950 7710 7240 1460 8860 5300 1090
CO2 9340 3240 7070 5450 5160 21 570 12 360 17 430 2960 18 820 8690 570
Methane 614 216 632 468 204 956 589 388 79.9 454 246 40
Ethylene 12.2 5.3 9.7 7.4 3.3 21.2 12.3 11.2 2.0 11.5 5.9 2.0
Propylene 12.8 7.6 12.3 9.3 8.0 36 21.4 28.3 5.3 32.6 15.9 ,0.5
Methanol 2.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.7 4.5 1.4 16.9 2.1 16.6 3.2 1.1
Propanal (aldehydes) 14 6.9 4.8 6.0 2.7 19 8.8 29 2.3 35 7.8 120
Ethane 18 32 ,5.0 ,5.0 15 23 13 25 9.2 32 15 380
Butane equivalents
b 237 275 842 626 591 512 321 265 63 393 219 83
Oxygen % 6%
5%
c 0.8% 8.4% 7.6% 16.9% 5.7% 10.9% 7.0%
All components except oxygen were measured with FTIR spectroscopy. All values in ppm except oxygen which is in %.
aThe results from Vessel #4 are means from measurements at four different levels of the stairway.
bSum concentration of alkanes (CnH2nþ2) with three or more carbons expressed as ppmv butane equivalents.
cParallel reading from head space in cargo hold.
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32007). A 10-min exposure at 1700 ppm or 30-min
exposure at 600 ppm has been proposed as the
airborne concentration of CO, above which it is
predicted that the general population, including
susceptible individuals, could experience life-threat-
ening health effects or death (NAS/COT, 2005). This
proposal assumes a normal oxygen level. With refer-
ence to Fig. 2
, it is seen that a predicted CO level of
600 ppm is reached when the oxygen level is 19.9%,
a condition reached after only 3 to 4 days at sea on
Vessel #4.
Scientiﬁc information is readily available regard-
ing the toxic effects of CO exposure and oxygen
deﬁciency when studied separately. However, the
information about any combined effects is very
sparse and appears to be limited to remarks about
possible effects at higher altitudes (WHO, 1999).
CO binds competitively to hemoglobin  200 times
more strongly than oxygen. It is likely that reduced
oxygen partial pressure increases the available sites
for CO binding and a toxic effect is caused more
quickly and at lower CO concentrations. Physical
activity will increase the uptake of CO. The US
NationalInstitute for Occupational Safety and Health
deﬁnes an oxygen-deﬁcient atmosphere as one with
an oxygen partial pressure of ,132 torr, equivalent
to  17.2% oxygen at sea level. Above this level,
no physiological effects are expected as a result of
oxygen deﬁciency. A minimum of 19.5% oxygen
level is recommended for most work situations and
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Fig. 3. The oxygen level in cargo hold headspace and bottom of stairway measured during ocean voyage (Vessel #4).
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Fig. 2. The correlation between oxygen and CO concentrations in hatches and stairways. The point representing 20.9% oxygen and
0% CO is added manually.
264 U. Svedberg, J. Samuelsson and S. Melinprovides a margin of safety (ACGIH, 2007). This
recommendation is only applicable if there are no
other toxic gases present, such as CO.
Since no wood pellets were present and no corro-
sion was discovered in the stairways at discharge,
which could have presented an alternative mecha-
nism for oxygen depletion, it was obvious that gas
moved quite freely between the cargo holds and
the related stairways. The concentrations in the stair-
ways were lower than in the cargo holds but still
remained at very high levels. The results from one
stairway showed that there was no stratiﬁcation of
concentrations; however, defective seals around
doors may in other cases increase leakage and gener-
ate low levels at the top and toxic levels at the bottom
of a stairway, creating a potential danger on entry.
The difference in gas concentrations observed
between the cargo holds on Vessel #5 is most proba-
bly an indication of such variation in gas leakage to
ambient air, rather than any differences in emission
rates.
The vessels’ instruction manuals speciﬁed 2 h of
self-ventilation prior to entry to the stairways. The
slow decay of CO, which we recorded, shows that
this is not sufﬁcient. The vessels that arrived after
the accident, introduced various methods to ventilate
their stairways. From observation, it was clear that
some crews were unaccustomed to the procedures
and had difﬁculties due to the use of inappropriate,
heavy and bulky equipment. The working space
was frequently cramped, particularly when a ventila-
tion hose was temporarily inserted and connected to
a fan unit placed near the deck-access door.
Before entering the stairway, oxygen and CO were
measured by the crew, by lowering a meter to the up-
per landing of the stairway. The lower landings could
not be ventilated until it was deemed safe to enter the
upper landing, whereupon a crew member was sent
down with the ventilation equipment to proceed to
the next level. In an unfortunate situation, pockets of
toxic gases could be released into a previously cleared
workspace. Understanding of the time required to
clear the toxic gases was the subject of signiﬁcant un-
certainty among the crew as was the understanding
that if a ventilated stairway is closed before the cargo
of wood pellets is discharged it must beventilated and
monitored again before anyone enters it.
The combined observations indicate the need for
the installations of well-designed, automatic, me-
chanical ventilation systems for the stairways. Such
systems would signiﬁcantly increase the safety of
the workers and prevent loss of expensive time in
port. The most appropriate type of ventilation for
stairways is probably a balanced-type ventilation
with mechanical supply and exhaust air, thus, limit-
ing the risks of pressure differences in relation to
the cargo holds. The second best solution is forcing
air to the bottom level of the stairway thereby dis-
placing contaminated air to the top level and further
to a free outside air space. Drawing air from the bot-
tom of the stairways should be avoided since there is
a risk that contaminated air will be drawn from the
cargo holds. On some vessels, the stairway deck-
access doors are located in semi-enclosed rooms.
The release of stairway air into such a space might
create a dangerous atmosphere.
Aventilation system should not be operated during
the voyage in order to avoid the risk of oxygenation
of the nearby cargo hold through leakage. Increased
oxidation of the pellets may lead to an elevated tem-
perature and uncontrolled thermal conditions in the
cargo, particularly when passing through warmer
tropical waters. The low oxygen content is in itself
a safeguard against uncontrolled oxidation. A ﬁre
at sea would be a disastrous scenario and very difﬁ-
cult to control, similar to ﬁres in silos.
Despite improved ventilation, it is important that
both oxygen and CO are measured before entry into
conﬁned spaces in contact with wood pellets. Ideally,
instrumentation should be calibrated for the oxygen
and CO levels that might occur. If the calibration is
made at a very different concentration than the level
to be measured, it may lead to a potentially gross
under- or over-estimation. However, instrumentation
designed for use with high concentrations may be less
accurate at low concentrations where clearance of
workspacesisrequired.Itmaybedifﬁculttoﬁndasin-
gle instrument that can accurately measure the whole
range from 0 to 15 000 ppm CO. Given the circum-
stances, it is of primary importance that the measuring
instruments are accurate at   19.5% oxygen and at
 35 ppm CO. The performance of the instruments,
such as recovery time and accuracy, after a shock ex-
posure to extreme concentrations of CO should be
speciﬁed by the manufacturers. To avoid shock expo-
sure of the instruments, it is possible to use color
indicator tubes designed for high CO levels, before
checking with electrochemical and galvanic cell
detectors.
A temporary and mobile workforce is characteris-
tic of the shipping industry. New crew members must
be effectively informed about the hazards associated
with wood materials. The provision of a Shipper
Cargo Information Sheet, which identiﬁes the inher-
ent hazardsassociated with the handlingof wood pel-
lets, is an important key to safe-guarding workers. It
also appears that emergency crews attending acci-
dents of this nature need to be better prepared in or-
der to avoid exposure when entering the scene of an
accident. The redesign of access doors would allow
easier entry and exit procedures and provide better
conditions during emergency rescue operations. It
is very difﬁcult to maneuver an unconscious person
via vertical ladders and through narrow doors, partic-
ularly if the rescuer is wearing cylinders with breath-
ing gas. Protective masks and ﬁlters are not effective
Hazardous off-gassing of CO and O2 depletion 265against CO and oxygen depletion, only self-contained
breathing apparatuses will work.
An immediate and cost-effective safety precaution
is to padlock and label all access doors to stairways
and establish and enforce the strict entry procedures
which are already stipulated in existing regulations.
Leaving entry doors open for ventilation is an invita-
tionforpeopletoenteratoxicatmosphere.Dooropen-
ingscouldbeﬁttedwithprotectivemesh,lettingairout
but preventing entry during ventilation. Warning signs
placed on top of doors will be hidden when the door is
open unless there is also a sign on the inside of such
doors. Repeated safety training or a certiﬁcation sys-
tem for the personnel in question is recommended.
CONCLUSIONS
Ocean transportation of wood pellets in conﬁned
spaces may rapidly produce lethal levels of CO and
an oxygen-deﬁcient atmosphere that may leak into
adjacent access spaces. This is the ﬁrst report to rec-
ognize this danger. The oxygen depletion and CO
formation are probably caused by oxidative degrada-
tion of natural lipids and other organic materials nat-
urally present in wood pellets. The oxygen depletion
may have a value in that it reduces the ﬁre hazard
associated with this cargo.
Measurement of both CO and oxygen levels is es-
sential prior to entry into spaces with air communica-
tion with a cargo of wood pellets. Measurement of
oxygen alone is not safe. Self-ventilation of stairways
is not sufﬁcient. Forced ventilation is necessary in or-
dertoachievesafeentryconditionswithinareasonable
time. The provision of proper gas monitoring instru-
ments and training and education of crews are of vital
importance as well as the proper design, labeling and
locking of access doors leading to conﬁned spaces.
The conclusions drawn here also apply generally to
other conﬁned spaces in contact with wood pellets.
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